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NOTE
THE RIGHT ISSUE, THE WRONG BRANCH:
ARGUMENTS AGAINST ADJUDICATING CLIMATE
CHANGE NUISANCE CLAIMS
Matthew Edwin Miller*
Climate change is probably today's greatest global environmental
threat,posing dire ecological, economic, and humanitarian consequences. In the absence of a comprehensive regulatory scheme to
address the problem, some aggrieved Americans have sought relief
from climate-relatedinjuries by suing significantemitters of greenhouse gases under a public nuisance theory. Federal district courts
have dismissedfour such claims, with each court relying at least in
part on the political question doctrine of nonjusticiability.However,
one circuit court of appeals has reversed to date, finding that the
common law cognizes such claims and that the judiciary is competent and compelled to adjudicate them.
This Note argues that courts should dismiss climate-relatedpublic
nuisance suits-at least those that seek injunctive caps on greenhouse gas emissions. Focusing on Connecticut v. American Electric
Power Co. as a case in point, this Note concludes that such claims
should be deemed nonjusticiable political questions or alternatively, should be dismissed for lack of redressability. As an
afterthought, the Note also briefly acknowledges some problems
that could arise on the merits of this category of claims, along with
policy concerns aboutpermitting such litigation.
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INTRODUCTION

The time has passed for debating whether climate change is a problem.
After years of skepticism, the scientific consensus tells us that global warming poses a grave threat to the natural environment as well as to human
health and welfare around the globe.' Although climate change is a complex
phenomenon with natural contributing factors, the most significant cause of
the current warming trend is the combustion of fossil fuels (oil, coal, and
natural gas), which releases gases that amplify the greenhouse effect in
Earth's atmosphere.2 The aggregation of ecological, economic, and social
1. See generally Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC], Climate Change
2007: Synthesis Report, at 2 (2008) [hereinafter IPCC, Synthesis Report], available at
http://www.ipcc.chtpublications-and datalpublicationsipccfourthassessment_report synthesis.r
eport.htm ("Observational evidence from all continents and most oceans shows that many natural
systems are being affected by regional climate changes, particularly temperature increases."); id. at
3 (noting "other effects" on "agricultural and forestry management," "heat related mortality," "infectious disease vectors," "hunting and travel over snow and ice," and "mountain sports"). The
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change ("IPCC") is a panel sponsored jointly by the United
Nations and the World Meteorological Organization ("WMO") whose publications represent the
work and ultimate conservative consensus of thousands of scientists and policymakers worldwide.
IPCC, Organization, http://www.ipcc.chlorganizationlorganization.htm (last visited Aug. 16, 2010).
Co-winner of the 2007 Nobel Peace Prize, IPCC, Synthesis Report, supra at ii, the IPCC is considered a comprehensive, objective voice on climate change science and policy, see, e.g., Envtl. Prot.
Agency, 2007 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Assessment Reports, http:l
www.epa.gov/climatechange/ipcc2007.html (last visited Aug. 16, 2010).
2. IPCC, Synthesis Report, supra note 1, at 36-41. Examples of natural contributing factors
include shifts in the eccentricity of Earth's orbit and in the tilt of its axis, solar flares, oceanic cycles,
and volcanic activity. IPCC, Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis, at 673-703 (2007)
[hereinafter IPCC, PhysicalScience Basis], availableat http://www.ipcc.ch/publications-and-datal
publications-ipec fourth_assessmentreportwg lreport he-physical-science basis.htm. Spurred
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harms attributable to the accelerating warming of the globe is frightening,
worsening, and multifarious.' Yet notwithstanding the urgency of the problem, nations of the world do not agree about legal and economic
mechanisms for mitigating or adapting to climate change.
In the United States, the absence of statutory regulation of greenhouse
gas ("GHG") emissions has prompted some injured parties to seek redress
via litigation through the common law tort of public nuisance. These plaintiffs allege that emissions generated by power plants, oil and gas companies,
and other corporations have harmed them by exacerbating the greenhouse
effect, thereby contributing to injuries that result from global warming. Federal district courts have refused to entertain such suits, justifying dismissal
on political question grounds-reasoning that adjudication is beyond the
purview of the judiciary-and sometimes on standing grounds as well.5 On
the other hand, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,6 along with several scholars, agree that courts can adjudicate climate change tort claims.
chiefly by the continuing, unprecedented spike in greenhouse gas emissions (most significantly
0
carbon dioxide), average global temperature is projected to rise approximately 1.80C-4.OoC over the
twenty-first century (relative to the 1980-1999 average). IPCC, Synthesis Report, supra note 1, at
36-45.
3. See IPCC, Synthesis Report, supra note 1, at 30-33, 48-54. Some harms to the environment and human welfare include the melting of ice caps and snowpacks, which leads to elevated sea
levels and coastal land loss as well as fresh-water shortages; droughts in some places and flooding
in others; stronger and more frequent extreme weather events; species displacement and extinction;
and increased malaria-related death rates. Id. With respect to economic harms, it has been estimated
that by 2050 the costs of global warming will reach $500 billion, given decreased agricultural and
fishing productivity, increased storm damages, and lost coastal real estate. TIM FLANNERY, THE
WEATHER MAKERS: How MAN IS CHANGING THE CLIMATE AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR LIFE ON

EARTH 236 (international ed. 2005). This figure does not incorporate economic losses resulting from
climate-change-related deaths.
4.

A public nuisance is defined as an unreasonable interference with a common right of the

general public. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 821B

(1979); see also infra note 78 (identify-

ing factors for evaluating reasonableness in the public nuisance context).
5.
Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 868 (N.D. Cal. 2009)
(political question and standing); California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 WL
2726871 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007) (political question); Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., No. 1:05CV-436-LG-RHW, 2007 WL 6942285 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 30, 2007) (political question and standing),
rev'd 585 F.3d 855 (5th Cir. 2009), reh'g en banc granted, 598 F.3d 208 (5th Cir. 2010), appeal
dismissed, 607 F.3d 1049 (5th Cir. 2010) (dismissing for lack of quorum); Connecticut v. Am. Elec.
Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 267-68 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (political question), rev'd, 582 F.3d 309
(2d Cir. 2009); see infra notes 24-26 regarding Kivalina, Comer, and American Electric Power.
6. Am. Elec. Power, 582 F.3d at 392. Notably, a three judge panel of the Fifth Circuit similarly reversed the dismissal of Comer shortly after the Second Circuit reversed and remanded
American Electric Power. However, the Fifth Circuit subsequently decided to rehear the appeal en
banc, thereby vacating the panel's reversal. After that, but before the circuit could rehear the case, an
additional circuit judge recused himself, leaving the court without a quorum to conduct further
proceedings. As such, the Comer appeal was dismissed by the Fifth Circuit, the district court's decision became "good law" once again, and the Comer plaintiffs were given leave to appeal their case
to the US Supreme Court. Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., No. 07-60756, 2010 WL 2136658 (5th
Cit. May 28, 2010).
7. E.g., Randall S. Abate, Automobile Emissions and Climate Change Impacts: Employing
Public Nuisance Doctrine as Part of a "Global Warming Solution" in California,40 CONN. L. REV.
591 (2008); Jonathan Zasloff, The Judicial Carbon Tax: Reconstructing Public Nuisance and Climate Change, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1827 (2008); Erin Casper Borissov, Note, Global Warming: A
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In considering the viability of climate change tort litigation, this Note
examines public nuisance suits that seek an injunctive emissions cap, as opposed to monetary damages, for a remedy. It focuses on injunctive suits
because Connecticut v. American Electric PowerCo.-the earliest, most far-

reaching climate nuisance claim now pending-uniquely contemplates such
relief, and because different arguments would apply to suits for damages.'
This Note argues that, in light of problems with justiciability and standing,
courts should dismiss injunctive climate nuisance suits like American Electric Power.9

Part I of this Note outlines the current legal regime with regard to climate change, providing context for American Electric Power and the
Second Circuit's reversal of the district court's dismissal of the case. Part II
introduces the political question doctrine of nonjusticiability, explains its
relevance to American Electric Power, and argues that the doctrine should
extend to that case. Courts have not previously held that public nuisance
claims present political questions. Nonetheless, the doctrine's articulation
permits such an extension in cases like American Electric Power, and its
basic purpose behooves it. Part IHl examines another potential bar to suit, the
constitutional standing requirement of redressability, and argues that the
court should have dismissed on this ground in the alternative. Finally, the
Conclusion identifies some problems that may arise on the merits of suits
like American Electric Power if they are found justiciable and redressable. It
also notes some policy considerations that further challenge the wisdom of
permitting such litigation.
I.

CLIMATE CHANGE POLITICS AND LAW GENERALLY

On the global level, governments and international organizations have
taken some steps to mitigate climate change, but action thus far has been
primarily limited to aspirational resolutions. The United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change has sponsored three major global agree-

Questionable Use of the Political Question Doctrine, 41 IND. L. REv. 415 (2008); Shawn M. LaTourette, Note, Global Climate Change: A Political Question?, 40 RUTGERs L. J. 219 (2008).
8. Unfortunately, space constraints prevent this Note from addressing climate nuisance
claims for damages, such as Comer and Kivalina. See infra notes 24-25. This Note limits its analysis to injunctive suits because that relief type is fundamental to this Note's redressability argument.
See infra Part m. The remedy distinction is also relevant to discussions of reasonableness and initial
policy determinations in political question analysis. See infra Part I. (Without attempting a thorough defense of the proposition that climate nuisance suits for damages should also be dismissed,
this Note's political question conclusion may be read to apply similarly to that kind of suit wherever
the political question arguments below-especially those regarding judicial unmanageability-do
not expressly rely on the injunctive element.)
9. This Note often invokes American Electric Power as a convenient illustration of how the
present arguments would operate in an actual lawsuit. Yet while all arguments herein apply to American Electric Power in particular, their reasoning is not limited to that case. Rather, the arguments
apply to the category of cases that American Electric Power exemplifies: climate-related public
nuisance suits seeking injunctive emissions caps.
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ments to reduce GHG emissions. First was the Rio Earth Summit of 1990,'o
which imposed no binding obligations on signatories, followed by the Kyoto
Protocol of 1997," which was only minimally successful because it failed to
limit the emissions of developing countries or the non-ratifying United
States.12 Greater urgency surrounded the December 2009 summit in Copenhagen, which sought to extend and improve upon the Kyoto framework," set
to expire in 2012. However, the accord produced by Copenhagen's 193 participating nations lacked the binding reductions pledges that many delegates
and commentators had emphasized as crucial.14
In the United States, federal law has largely avoided the climate issue,
but recent steps towards GHG regulation signal that change is forthcoming.
Proposals are pending in Congress to implement comprehensive energy reforms, emissions reductions, and climate change mitigation strategies.1
10. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S.
107, availableat http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf.
11. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec.
11, 1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 162, available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf.
12. See generally Managing Planet Earth: Preservation Without Purity: From Montreal to
Rio to Johannesburg:15 Years of EnvironmentalAccords, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 20, 2002, at Fl0. Other
conferences, such as the 2007 summit in Bali, have supplemented the prior agreements. E.g., United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Bali, Indonesia, Dec. 3-15, 2007, Report of the
Conference of the Parties on its 13th Sess.: Bali Action Plan, Decision 1/CP13, U.N. Doc.
FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.l (Mar. 14, 2008), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2007/copl3/
eng/06a0l.pdf.
13. See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
supra note 11.
14. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Copenhagen, Denmark,
Dec. 7, 2009-Dec. 19, 2009 Report of the Conference of the Partieson its 15th Sess.: Copenhagen
Accord, Decision 2/CP15, Mar. 30, 2010, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1, available at
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/copl5/eng/l1a01.pdf. Promisingly, major emitting nations
agreed to limit GHGs in principle and mechanisms were put into place for providing economic aid
to developing countries for clean energy as well as climate harm mitigation. However, many have
lamented a lack of ambitiousness in both of those aims.
15. Current federal legislation includes only statements of purpose and programs for research. In 1990, for instance, Congress enacted the Global Change Research Act of 1990,
establishing a ten-year research program for global climate issues. Pub. L. No. 101-606, 104 Stat.
3096 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2931-2938 (2006)). Other research-oriented programs
also exist. E.g., Global Climate Change Prevention Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-624, § 2402, 104
Stat. 4058, 4058-59 (codifed as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 6701 (2006)) (providing for agriculturerelated climate research); Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, § 1604, 106 Stat. 2776,
3002 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 13384 (2006)).
16. The House of Representatives approved the American Clean Energy and Security Act,
H.R. 2454 (the "Waxman-Markey" bill) on June 26, 2009. Press Release, Representative Edward J.
Markey, House Passes Historic Waxman-Markey Clean Energy Bill (June 26, 2009), available at
http://markey.house.gov/index.php?option=comcontent&task=view&id=3748&Itemid=1. A corresponding proposal, the Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act (the "Kerry-Boxer" bill), was
put forth in the Senate on September 30, 2009. Press Release, Sen. John Kerry, Boxer Introduce
"Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act" (Sept. 30, 2009), available at http://
kerry.senate.gov/press/release/?id=67cl4clf-275b-4489-8170-99da24aalbfl. More recently, Sen.
John D. Rockefeller IV (D-W.Va.) introduced legislation to suspend regulation of GHGs by the
EPA, see infra notes 19-21, for two years while Congress debates energy and emissions reforms.
Press Release, Sen. John D. Rockefeller IV, Rockefeller Introduces Legislation to Suspend EPA
Action and Protect Clean Coal State Economies (Mar. 4, 2010), available at
http://rockefeller.senate.gov/press/record.cfm?id=322764.
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Moreover, prompted by the Supreme Court's only climate change ruling to
date, Massachusetts v. EPA," the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA")
has initiated the preliminary stages of regulating greenhouse gasses under
the Clean Air Act ("CAA"). In Massachusetts, a 5-4 majority held that the
EPA was required to issue a reasoned decision, grounded in the CAA, about
why it would or would not make an official finding about whether motorvehicle GHG emissions threaten human health and welfare by contributing
to climate change.'" In December 2009, considering the issue pursuant to the
CAA, the EPA made such an "endangerment" finding-a prerequisite trigger for further regulation under various sections of the statute." In April
2010, the EPA promulgated, in conjunction with the Department of Transportation, stricter standards for auto emissions and fuel economy.20 The EPA
is also moving forward with emissions reporting requirements for large stationary sources of GHGs, despite the Obama Administration's preference
for congressional legislation to address climate issues instead." Regional,
22
state-level, and private-market efforts to reduce emissions exist as well.
In lieu of congressional or EPA emissions regulation preempting climate
nuisance claims (such preemption could conceivably occur within one year),
some Americans have turned to the courts to respond to climate change. To
date, four public nuisance lawsuits related to climate harms have been filed
in federal courts. All have been dismissed at the district level on political
question or standing grounds.23 In the fall of 2009, the Second Circuit re-

17.

549 U.S. 497 (2007).

18.

Id. at 501.

19. EPA, Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases under
Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009). The endangerment finding was made under Title H of the CAA, which concerns only motor vehicle emissions. However,
the statutory language in other sections of the CAA is similar to that of Title II, so the EPA's endangerment finding in the motor vehicle emissions context could be extended to emissions from other
sources as well. See NATHAN RICHARDSON, GREENHOUSE GAS REGULATION UNDER THE CLEAN
AIR ACT: DOES Chevron v. NRDC SET THE EPA FREE? 4 (2009), http://www.rff.org/RFF/
Documents/RFF-DP-09-50.pdf.
20. Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel
Economy Standards, 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324 (May 7, 2010) (codified in scattered parts of 40 C.F.R.
and 49 C.ER.).
21. Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gases, 74 Fed. Reg. 56,260 (Oct. 30, 2009) (codified as amended in scattered parts of 40 C.F.R.); John M. Broder, E.A. ProposesNew Regulations
on Industry Gas, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2009, at Al. Such regulation, if not preempted by Congress,
could be completed by 2011. See Letter from Lisa Jackson, EPA Administrator, to Sen. John D.
Rockefeller IV (Feb. 22, 2010), available at http://epa.gov/oar/pdfs/LPJ_1etter.pdf (anticipating
regulation of large stationary emissions sources by 2011 and discussing the possibility of precluding
CAA regulation of GHGs if a resolution proposed by Sen. Lisa Murkowski were enacted).
22.

E.g., California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY

CODE

§ 38500 (West, Westlaw through 2009 Reg. Sess.) (outlining broad policy initiatives in California to
address climate change); Chicago Climate Exchange, http://www.chicagoclimatex.com/ (last visited
Aug. 16, 2010) (voluntary carbon trading market open to private and public entities); Regional
Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) C02 Budget Trading Program, http://www.rggi.org/home (last
visited Aug. 16, 2010) (mandatory cap-and-trade program for power plant emissions spanning ten
northeastern and mid-atlantic states).
23.

See cases cited supranote 5.
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versed one of those dismissals.24 Shortly thereafter, however, the Northern
District of California dismissed its second climate nuisance claim, expressly
declining to follow the Second Circuit's lead in entertaining such suits.2
American Electric Power, pending in the Southern District of New York
after remand by the Second Circuit, is the earliest complaint, the first reversal, and the most exhaustive opinion to date. It is also unique in that it
involves injunctive relief, implicates the broadest array of litigants, and includes states as plaintiffs.26
American Electric Power commenced in 2004 when eight states and
New York City brought an action in the Southern District of New York seeking abatement of an alleged public nuisance caused by the carbon dioxide
("Co,") emissions of five large electric utilities. 27 The plaintiffs pointed to
the "clear scientific consensus" that global warming has begun, identifying
greenhouse gas emissions as a significant accelerating cause. 28 According to
the complaint, the defendants' annual emission of 650 million tons of CO2
has proximately caused global-warming-related injuries such as degradation
of the physical environment, loss of recreation and land use, and heightened
threats to human health and welfare.2 9 For these reasons, the plaintiffs
sought to hold the defendants jointly and severally liable for the alleged nuisance, to cap the defendants' CO 2 emissions, and to tighten that cap by a

24. A three judge panel of the Fifth Circuit likewise reversed a climate nuisance dismissal,
but after a rare series of procedural developments, that decision was vacated and the district court's
dismissal reinstated. See Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
25. Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 E Supp. 2d 863, 875-76 (N.D. Cal.
2009) (disagreeing with the Second Circuit's conclusions as to the "existence of judicially discoverable or manageable standards" for resolving climate change nuisance claims); id. at 880 n.7
(rejecting as circular the Second Circuit's Article ill standing reasoning). In Kivalina, an Alaskan
Inuit village sued a number of energy companies for damages, alleging that the defendants' emissions catalyzed the loss of community-sustaining ice shelves. The court dismissed the federal claims
as presenting a political question and for lack of standing. Id. at 883 (also dismissing the plaintiffs'
state law claims); see also California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 WL 2726871
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007) (similarly dismissing climate-change-related federal public nuisance
claims against automobile makers on political question grounds and declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state claims).
26. Comer and Kivalina are very important, to be sure, but are distinguishable from American Electric Power in several ways: (1) in both cases, the plaintiffs seek monetary damages to
compensate past injuries, not injunctive relief to enjoin emissions and mitigate ongoing and future
harms (which pertains to questions of judicial manageability and policy determinations as well as
redressability); (2) in Comer, the plaintiffs are class-action individuals, not governmental entities
(which could affect standing); and (3) in Comer, the claims are grounded in state, not federal, common law (which could bear on grounds for stating a claim as well as preemption issues). Native Vill.
of Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 863; Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., No. 1:05-CV-436-LG-RHW, 2007
WL 6942285 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 30, 2007). As such, while those cases will doubtlessly have important
repercussions for the climate change nuisance legal scene, an extended analysis of them is beyond
the scope of this Note.
27. 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 267-68 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). The plaintiff states are Connecticut, California, Iowa, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Wisconsin. The suit was later
consolidated with a similar complaint filed by three land trusts. Id.
28.

Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 314 (2d Cir. 2009).

29.

Id. at 314-19.
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specified percentage each year.so The district court dismissed the case as
presenting a nonjusticiable political question." Four years later, the Second
Circuit vacated that decision and remanded the case to the district court,
ruling that the political question doctrine does not bar suit, that the plaintiffs
have standing, and that the plaintiffs had stated a valid claim under federal
common law which was not preempted by any federal statute.
II. CASES LiKE AMERICAN ELECTRIc POWER SHOULD

BE

DEEMED NONJUSTICIABLE

The political question doctrine should bar adjudication of climate
change public nuisance cases-at least those that, like American Electric
Power, contemplate injunctive emissions caps as a remedy. The judiciary
cannot prudentially manage relief nor make initial policy determinations in
such litigation. Instead, it is constitutionally proper for the executive branch
or Congress to do so. Section II.A outlines the history of the doctrine, setting a framework for political question analysis in climate nuisance cases.
Section II.B, using American Electric Power as a case in point, reviews the
Second Circuit's political question analysis in holding that injunctive nuisance claims are justiciable. Section II.C argues that the political question
doctrine plausibly extends to public nuisances and that a case like American
Electric Power warrants dismissal because it implicates at least two political
question factors.
A. The Purpose,Development, and Articulation
of the Political Question Doctrine

The political question doctrine arises from the constitutional separation
of powers.33 The doctrine originated in Marbury v. Madison, in which Chief
Justice Marshall held that the judiciary must refrain from deciding issues
relegated to another branch of the federal govemment. The doctrine bars
courts from deciding "controversies which revolve around policy choices
and value determinations constitutionally committed for resolution to ...
Congress or ... the Executive branch,"3' recognizing that courts are "fundamentally underequipped to formulate national policies or develop
standards of conduct for matters not legal in nature." The dominant considerations in evaluating potential political questions are "the appropriateness

30.

Id. at 318.

31.

Am. Elec. Power, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 274.

32.

Am. Elec. Power, 582 E3d at 392-93.

33.

See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 220 (1962).

34.

5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 165-66 (1803).

35.

Japan Whaling Ass'n v. Am. Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986).

36. United States ex rel. Joseph v. Cannon, 642 F.2d 1373, 1379 (1981), quoted in Japan
Whaling, 478 U.S. at 230.
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under our system of government of attributing finality to the action of the
political departments and also the lack of satisfactory criteria for a judicial
determination."
In theory, political questions contain two interconnected elements: a
constitutional aspect, concerned with commitments of authority to Congress
or the executive branch as opposed to the judiciary, and a prudential aspect,
concerned with judicial competence, credibility, and institutional restraint.1
The constitutional and prudential shades of the doctrine are not delineated
by distinct formal tests but emphasize different sides of the basic principle
of separation of powers. The prudential strand applies more strongly to
American Electric Power because the arguments for nonjusticiability stem
chiefly from considerations of institutional competence rather than from
explicit constitutional allocations of authority.
The Supreme Court has been reluctant to refuse cases on political question grounds, and when it has, the Court has relied more on constitutional,
rather than prudential, considerations. 9 However, the prudential aspect is
neither theoretically misguided nor precedentially obsolete.0 The seminal
modem political question case, Baker v. Carr, implicitly preserved the legitimacy of the prudential aspect by recognizing that "even in private
litigation which directly implicates no feature of separation of powers, lack
of judicially discoverable standards and the drive for even-handed application" may demand judicial abstention. 4 ' The Court re-emphasized the
prudential aspect in Vieth v. Jubelirer,42 its most recent consideration of the
44
41
political question doctrine.43 Writing for the Vieth plurality on a
37.

Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 454-55 (1939), quoted in Baker, 369 U.S. at 210.

38. See Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme than Court? The Fallof the Political Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REv. 237, 240 (2002) (calling the electorally
insulated judiciary a "poor factfinder and policymaker as compared to Congress and the Executive");
id. at 253 ("Unlike the classical [or 'constitutional'] strand ... the prudential [strand] is not anchored in
an interpretation of the Constitution itself, but is instead a judge-made overlay that courts have used at
their discretion to protect their legitimacy and to avoid conflict with the political branches.").
39.

See id. at 267-68.

40. But see id (noting the demise of the prudential prong in Supreme Court jurisprudence);
id. at 332-34 (deeming the prudential prong an unprincipled, unmanageable, and "unjustified dereliction of the Court's duty"); Mark Tushnet, Law and Prudence in the Law of Justiciability:The
Transformationand Disappearanceof the PoliticalQuestion Doctrine, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1203, 120305 (2002) (identifying a migration of concern regarding judicial prudence away from invocation of
the political question doctrine, towards stauncher application of standing requirements). Significantly, these commentaries were published before the Supreme Court decided Vieth v. Jubelirer,541
U.S. 267 (2004). See infra notes 42-50 and accompanying text.
41.
369 U.S. 186, 213-14, 237 (1962) (finding justiciable a case involving voting district
reapportionment, and making the quoted pronouncement in the context of judicial deference to
political proclamations in determining when war had commenced).
42. 541 U.S. 267 (2004) (dismissing a gerrymandering claim as a nonjusticiable political
question).
43. In League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, a subsequent gerrymandering case
that implicated the doctrine, the Court declined to "revisit [Vieth's] justiciability holding." 548 U.S.
399, 414 (2006).
44. It is imperative, when considering the precedential value of Vieth, to recognize that although Justice Scalia's opinion commanded only a four-justice plurality, Justice Kennedy,
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gerrymandering claim, Justice Scalia observed, "One of the most obvious
limitations imposed by [the Constitution] is that judicial action must be governed by standard,by rule. Laws promulgated by the Legislative Branch
can be inconsistent, illogical, and ad hoc; law pronounced by the courts
must be principled, rational, and based on reasoned distinctions."45
Justice Scalia dedicated much of his analysis to demonstrating that
courts could not, in any principled manner, discern whether gerrymandering
had occurred in the first place.4 However, he repeatedly distinguished the
judiciary's ability to cognize a violation-a constitutional considerationfrom its ability to manage a remedy-a prudential consideration.47 In other
words, even if some test could identify unlawful gerrymandering, no sufficiently principled standard would exist to guide the judiciary in competently
managing its resolution.4 Answering the many intricate questions about how
a gerrymandering claim might be resolved-including "How much remedying of packing . .. ? How many legislatorsmust have had the intent ... and
how efficacious must that intent have been . . . ?"-would require "a quanti-

fying judgment that is unguided and ill suited to the development of judicial
standards." 9 Justice Kennedy's concurrence similarly stressed an "absence
of rules to limit and confine judicial intervention" and a "lack of comprehensive and neutral principles" for identifying as well as remedying
gerrymandering.o Thus, the prudential component of the political question
doctrine, though rarely relied upon, has not vanished from the Court's jurisprudence. Lower courts have also acknowledged the importance of

concurring in the judgment, expressly agreed with the plurality's evaluation of unmanageability
under the circumstances. 541 U.S. at 306-11. Justice Kennedy chose not to join the plurality opinion
because he believed that a manageable adjudicatory standard was conceivable and worried about
foreclosing future claims. Id. at 306. Vieth's finding of unmanageability thus bears the authoritative
effect of a majority opinion. See id. at 308. In other words, it would be wrong to construe Justice
Kennedy's concurrence as frustrating the application of political question doctrine where manageability is lacking. But see Barasich v. Columbia Gulf Transmission Co., 467 F. Supp. 2d 676, 68384 (E.D. La. 2006) (adopting a more liberal interpretation of justiciability in light of Vieth and declining to invoke the political question doctrine in a claim alleging destructive inducement of coastal
erosion).
45.

541 U.S. at 278.

46.

Id. at 281-301.

47. Id. at 287-88 ("Before considering whether this particular standard is judicially manageable we question whether it is judicially discernible in the sense of being relevant to some
constitutional violation."); id. at 290 ("[W]e find appellants' proposed standards neither discernible
nor manageable."); id. at 295 ("Even if [a standard] could be manageably applied ... there is no
reason to think [it] would detect the constitutional crime . . .
48.

Id. at 288, 290.

49. Id. at 296. One might contend that the reasoning in Vieth should not apply to American
Electric Power because of the cases' distinguishable procedural dispositions. Justice Scalia noted
that since Vieth had been ruled justiciable by the lower court (though the gerrymandering claims
were found unsupported by the facts), the Supreme Court then had to "either enunciate the standard
that causes us to agree or disagree with that merits judgment, or else affirm that the claim is beyond
our competence to adjudicate." Id. at 303-04. However, that argument dodges on a procedural technicality the relevant underlying questions about principled justiciability.
50.

Id. at 306-07 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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prudential considerations, holding that "[pirudence, as well as separation-ofpowers concerns, counsels courts to decline to hear 'political questions.' "
In determining political question justiciability, contemporary courts look
to the six factors set forth in Baker that contemplate constitutional and prudential elements and are "probably listed in descending order of both
importance and certainty"52 :
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is
found [1] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue
to a coordinate political department; or [2] a lack of judicially discoverable
and manageable standards for resolving it; or [3] the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for
nonjudicial discretion; or [4] the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate
branches of government; or [5] an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or [6] the potentiality of
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments
on one question."
Political questions are more than just political cases; the doctrine will
not bar suit when a case is merely politically charged. 54 Rather, dismissal is
appropriate when one of Baker's six formulations is "inextricable" from the
controversy.5 Making Baker determinations demands a "discriminating inquiry into the precise facts and posture of the particular case, [rejecting]
resolution by any semantic cataloguing."5 6 The second and third Baker factors are partly prudential in nature: the former because cases lacking neutral
principles to justify and limit judicial management implicate judicial credibility and restraint; the latter because judicially inappropriate initial policy
determinations pertain to institutional competence.

51. Schroder v. Bush, 263 F.3d 1169, 1173 (10th Cir. 2001); see also In re African-American
Slave Descendants Litig., 375 F. Supp. 2d 721, 765 (N.D. Ill. 2005) ("Prudential limits on the exercise of [judicial] power" including interests in "efficiency and legitimacy ... play an important role
in the political question doctrine").
52. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 278. Baker has provided the basis for political question analysis since
its promulgation. E.g., id. at 267 (with the plurality, concurring, and dissenting opinions invoking
the Baker test). Every climate change nuisance decision has followed the Baker framework.
53.

Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).

54. Id. In Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro Ed Altrigestione Mononave Achille Lauro In
Amministrazione Staordinaria,for instance, a lawsuit against Palestinian airline hijackers survived
political question scrutiny, notwithstanding the political sensitivities involved. 937 E2d 44, 49 (2d
Cir. 1991).
55.

Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.

56.

Id.

57.

See infra note 100 and accompanying text.
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B. The Second Circuit'sPoliticalQuestion Analysis in

American Electric Power
To better contextualize the political question considerations necessary in
injunctive climate nuisance claims, it is worth examining, as a preliminary
matter, the Second Circuit's reversal of the district court's finding of nonjusticiability in American Electric Power. The court dedicated a significant
portion of its opinion to refuting the lower court's political question
determination, addressing each Baker factor and deciding that none barred
suit." This Note argues that the second and third Baker factors provide the
best grounds for dismissal.5 9
The Second Circuit devoted more analysis to the second Baker factor,
regarding judicially manageable standards for resolving a controversy, than
to any other.6 The court concluded that because federal courts could assess
complex scientific evidence and rule according to "recognized judicial standards under the federal common law of nuisance," the factor of
unmanageability did not apply.' The defendants had contended that the
complexities presented by American Electric Power far exceeded those of
prior pollution control cases; thus the "vague and indeterminate nuisance
concepts and maxims of equity" gleaned from public nuisance precedent
and the Restatement (Second) of Torts provided insufficient guidance.62 The
Second Circuit, however, cited to older decisions purporting to show that
"federal courts have successfully adjudicated complex common law public
nuisance cases for over a century." 63 Encapsulating its position on this point,
the court observed that, in general, complexity alone "is not a reason for
federal courts to shy away from adjudication.""
The court then dealt with the third Baker factor, regarding initial policy
determinations of a kind for nonjudicial discretion, identifying this factor as
the basis of the district court's dismissal.6 The American Electric Power
58.

Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 321-32 (2d Cir. 2009).

59. The first Baker factor is not implicated; only one of the four political question dismissals
of climate nuisance suits found a textual commitment to another branch. California v. Gen. Motors
Corp., No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 WL 2726871, at *13-14 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007). Stronger
arguments exist for the fourth, fifth, and sixth factors. For instance, the fourth factor could be relevant as Congress debates climate bills and as the EPA moves forward with GHG regulation. See
supra notes 16, 19-21 and accompanying text. Judicial injunctions against GHG emissions might
thereby express a "lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government." Baker, 369 U.S. at
217. However, these factors have been of little or no importance to political question determinations.
E.g., In re African-American Slave Descendants Litig., 375 F. Supp. 2d 721, 764-65 (N.D. 111.2005)
(holding that the factors were sufficiently addressed by evaluating the first three).
60.

Am. Elec. Power, 582 F.3d at 326-30.

61.

Id. at 329.

62. Id. at 326 (quoting City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 317 (1981)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
63. Id. at 326-27. It also referenced precedent supporting the invocation of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts in a variety of federal tort actions. Id. at 327-28.
64.

Id. at 329 (citing Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264,404 (1821)).

65.

Id. at 330.
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defendants contended on appeal that a trial court's decision would require
making initial policy decisions about "whether to impose mandatory greenhouse gas emissions limits and, if so, on whom, in what manner and at what
cost"-determinations more appropriate for a "comprehensive response"
from the political branches.6 The Second Circuit rejected this conclusion
and emphasized that the common law may properly fill gaps in statutory
regulation.67 Deeming the case "an ordinary tort suit" requiring no initial
policy determinations, the court held Baker's third prong inapplicable.
C. At Least Two Baker Factors Should Apply to Cases Like

American Electric Power
The second and third Baker factors favor dismissal of cases like American Electric Power as a nonjusticiable political question. Subsection 1 of
this Section argues that the political question doctrine plausibly extends to
climate nuisance claims, and that refusal to extend it to such claims has
rested upon circular, oversimplified framings of the litigation. Subsections 2
and 3 address the second and third Baker factors respectively, concluding
that the judiciary lacks the institutional competence and constitutional mandate to prudentially decide this controversy.
1. Extending the PoliticalQuestion Doctrine to
Climate Nuisance Suits

The political question doctrine has never barred adjudication of nonclimate-related public nuisance claims, but it should not automatically follow that those pertaining to climate change are justiciable. The Second
Circuit decided that the doctrine did not apply because it framed American
Electric Power as an ordinary tort suit. However, that court's conclusory
oversimplification of climate nuisance claims downplays their scope, fails to
appreciate their underlying dynamics, and oversimplifies the determinations
required by their adjudication. Perfunctory labeling thereby lays a faulty
foundation for analysis of the Baker factors.
The chief argument against applying the political question doctrine to
climate nuisance cases, as one commentator put it succinctly, is as follows:
The complexity of [climate change nuisance] cases, or speculation about
issues that may arise downstream in the litigation, should not color the assessment of their manageability... . [C]ourts need not await a policy
66.

Id.

67. Id. ("Congress's mere refusal to legislate ... falls far short of an expression of legislative
intent to supplant the existing common law in that area." (quoting United States v. Texas, 507 U.S.
529, 535 (1993)). Further, the Second Circuit noted neither Congress nor the executive branch favored increasing GHGs, but rather were concerned about global warming. Id. at 331. The court
noted that plaintiffs can bring federal common law public nuisance claims when existing statutes fail
to provide a remedy through comprehensive pollution control in that area. Id. at 330-31 (citing
Milwaukee, 406 U.S. at 101-02).
68.

Id. at 331.
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decision from the political bra[n]ches in order to adjudicate these matters
because the tort law on which these public nuisance claims are based constitutes an established policy from which the courts must draw their
standards.6
In other words, the contention is that climate nuisance claims fall under tort
law's general theoretical umbrella, so a tort framework provides sufficient
guidance for judicial resolution of the claims, thus avoiding the second
Baker factor. Moreover, since the court's decisions will follow from established tort principles, adjudication will not require new, inappropriate policy
determinations, making the third Baker factor inapplicable.
However, to say that cases like American Electric Power are justiciable
just because plaintiffs allege a public nuisance begs the question: Why
should such claims automatically be justiciable? It contravenes the purpose
and articulation of the political question doctrine to suggest that nuisances
are categorically justiciable because political questions have historically
excluded torts between private parties and have focused instead on governmental issues like gerrymandering, foreign policy, and federal
employment. 70 Again, Baker demanded "discriminating" case-by-case inquiries, rejecting "resolution by any semantic cataloguing."" Similarly, the
fact that other public nuisance claims have not presented political questions
in the past should not preclude such a finding in the climate context.72 In
deed, the argument for nonjusticiability rests on the notion that climate suits
are unique and therefore defy classification among tort precedent.
69.

LaTourette, supra note 7, at 283-84.

70.

See generally Barkow, supra note 38.

71. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 189, 217 (1962); see also McKay v. United States, 703 F.2d 464,
470 (10th Cir. 1983) ("[T]he political question theory ... doles] not ordinarily prevent individual
tort recoveries.") (emphasis added). But see Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro Ed Altrigestione
Mononave Achille Lauro In Amministrazione Staordinaria, 937 F.2d 44, 49 (2d Cir. 1991) (finding a
lawsuit against airline hijackers judicially manageable because "the common law of tort provides
clear and well-settled rules"); Borissov, supra note 7, at 438-39 (noting that political questions
involve controversies more "constitutional" than public nuisance claims); LaTourette, supra note 7,
at 239 ("[T]ort law supplies courts [in environmental cases] with judicially manageable standards,
the presence of which obviate the need for any initial policy decision from the political branches.").
72. But see Borissov, supra note 7, at 443-44 (calling American Electric Power a "regular
public nuisance case" despite the novelty of climate issues); LaTourette, supra note 7, at 258-59
(reasoning that climate litigation categorically is manageable under Baker since "the courts have a
long-established tradition of adjudicating public nuisance claims, and possess the legal tools to fix
remedies in such actions").
73. Borissov discusses only one other nuisance case at any substantial length, Georgia v.
Tennessee Copper Co., 237 U.S. 474 (1915), for the proposition that American Electric Power is a
"regular" case. Borissov, supra note 7, at 447. However, a comparison to Tennessee Copper is ultimately unsatisfying. See infra note 87 and accompanying text. LaTourette discusses other
environmental cases, including Gordon v. Texas, 153 F.3d 190 (5th Cir. 1998) and Barasich v. Columbia Gulf Transmission Co., 467 F. Supp. 2d 676 (E.D. La. 2006), in which erosion-related claims
survived political question challenges. LaTourette, supranote 7, at 252-53, 257-58. Those decisions
are distinguishable because, besides not being nuisance suits, they each contemplated damages, not
injunctive relief. The Gordon court emphasized the inherently greater manageability of suits for
damages, 153 F.3d at 195, while the Barasich court, invoking Gordon, distinguished American
Electric Power on the grounds that it sought an injunction, 467 F Supp. 2d at 685-86. See also infra
note 88.
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Extending the political question doctrine to a public nuisance allegation
would surpass precedent in terms of claim-category application. Yet with
respect to the theory behind the doctrine, such an extension is proper because cases like American Electric Power would push existing nuisance law
to embrace a complex, qualitatively unique phenomenon that cannot be prudentially adjudicated. The Supreme Court has never held that torts cannot
present political questions, so prudential constitutional principles should
similarly apply to them. This Note simply argues that the facts, claims, parties, and relief demanded in this particular mode of litigation should fall
under the nonjusticiability umbrella, wherever its limits may lie." The following analysis of Baker invokes the American Electric Power situation

specifically for the sake of convenience, but the arguments therein should be
read to apply to injunctive climate nuisance claims generally.
2. The Second Baker Factor:Judicially ManageableStandards

Judicially manageable standards do not exist for deciding reasonableness and fashioning an emissions cap in American Electric Power, since
existing authority does not provide principled guidance for adjudicating the
76
novel dynamics of climate change. Analogous to the problematic gerrymandering questions in Vieth," critical questions regarding reasonableness
undermine judicial manageability in American Electric Power. In order to
prudentially resolve the merits of the claims, legal authorities must provide a
framework for deciding reasonableness in the alleged unreasonable interference with a common right of the general public. Of course, a judge could
"resolve" the case by enjoining the defendants pursuant to some new standard for emissions reasonableness, just as a judge could have promulgated
and applied a gerrymandering test in Vieth. The relevant inquiry, however, is
whether there exists sufficient legal guidance for a judge to discover and
implement a standard in a principled, consistent manner.7 9 Public nuisance
74.

See infra note 84 and accompanying text.

75. This Note does not purport to suggest exactly where the line ought to be drawn in applying the political question doctrine to tort claims. A consideration of the potential doctrinal "slippery
slope"-where courts might improperly refuse to adjudicate claims solely on the basis of complexity-is beyond the scope of the present discussion.
76. This Note considers the second factor first because the Baker criteria "are probably listed
in descending order of both importance and certainty." Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 278 (2004).
Also, one district court has held that "an initial policy determination [the third factor] is unnecessary
when there are judicially manageable standards [the second factor]." Barasich,467 F. Supp. 2d at
686-87.
77. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. Questions regarding manageability under the
second Baker factor may overlap with questions regarding initial policy determinations under the
third Baker factor. See infra Section I.C.3.
78. Reasonableness factors include the significance of the conduct's interference with public
health, safety, peace, comfort, or convenience; the legality of the activity; whether the conduct is
continual or lasting; and whether the defendant had reason to know the effect was significant. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B.
79. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 278 ("[L]aw pronounced by the courts must be principled, rational,
and based upon reasoned distinctions.").
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law simply does not meaningfully guide the adjudication of American Electric Power the way it does traditional claims involving discrete river
pollution or noxious fume emissions.so
First, even the most comparable cases that the Second Circuit could
identify as examples of principled judicial management of nuisance claims
are still fundamentally off-point. Those decisions range from 1851 to 1972,
with only one after 1931 and the most relied upon decisions-Missouriv.
Illinois" and Georgiav. Tennessee Copper Co.82-- dating to the early twentieth century." Age does not invalidate precedent, of course. Here, though, the
precedent's age inversely correlates with its analogousness to the current
claim. Unlike in the cited cases, consideration of injury, causation, and reasonableness in American Electric Power would entail confronting a diffuse
causal process with billions of culprits and novel lag-effect dynamics, internal feedback loops, and statistically manifesting harms. 4 Climate change
has a lag effect because there is an unpredictable, sometimes centuries-long
delay between the GHG emissions and the manifestation of the environmental or societal harm, due to the causal domino effect contained between
the initial cause and the final effect. Internal feedback loops of cyclical
greenhouse-effect self-exacerbation add to the complexity and uncertainty
of global warming's cause-effect dynamic. Further complicating matters,
climate harms, like extreme weather events or changes in precipitation,
manifest themselves statistically, such that there is no point at which one can
say, "This, now, is the result of climate change." Rather, events just become
more likely and more severe. This categorically distinct phenomenon cannot
be cognized under the same framework used to evaluate, for example, a
bridge's interference with navigation."
80. Accord Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 875 (N.D.
Cal. 2009) (finding that the "long, prior history of air and water pollution cases" did not provide
sufficient guidance for fashioning principled relief).
81. 200 U.S. 496 (1906) (holding that Missouri had not established injury and causation in a
nuisance suit in equity against Illinois for Chicago's discharge of sewage into the Mississippi River's tributary system).
82. 206 U.S. 230 (1907) (granting injunctive relief to Georgia when noxious emissions from
cross-border copper foundries were harming Georgia lands).
83.

Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 326-27 (2d Cir. 2009).

84. See generally IPCC, Physical Science Basis, supra note 2, ch. 8. To illustrate the lag
effect between a utility's emissions (the original cause) and a rise in sea levels (the ultimate harm):
the GHG molecules must disperse in the atmosphere, add to the trapping of solar and thermal radiation, thereby increasing temperatures, which melts icecaps, and leads to thermal expansion of the
oceans, thus elevating sea levels-a process that takes literally centuries to unfold. To illustrate
internal feedback loops: at some imprecise point, rising temperatures in the Amazon could cross a
threshold where the rainforest stops generating its own precipitation, transforming jungle into savannah and releasing gigatons of GHGs. In other words, when a system is pushed past the brink of
internal stability, transformative processes within that closed system initiate a cycle of selfexacerbation, without additional pressures from outside systems. Finally, to illustrate statistical
manifestation: while hurricanes have always occurred, global warming will make them stronger and
more probable.
85. But see Am. Elec. Power, 582 F.3d at 327 (citing, among other cases, a Supreme Court
decision from 1851 regarding bridge interference as evidence of competent judicial management of
nuisance claims).
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The cited precedents, with their relatively simple, confined, discrete nuisance elements, do not offer meaningful standards for assessing
reasonableness in the GHG emissions context and are thus distinguishable
from the claims in American Electric Power. Kivalina-a post-American

Electric Power climate nuisance decision-rightly distinguished the cited
nuisance precedents because they involved "a discrete number of 'polluters'
that were identified as causing a specific injury to a specific area," and because their discharges were harmful per se-in contrast to the sequential
chain of consequences separating GHG emissions from the eventual mani86
festation of climate injuries.
Taking Kivalina's observations a step farther, an array of fundamental
factual changes would be necessary to make the cases relied upon by the
Second Circuit sufficiently comparable to American Electric Power as to
provide an analogous standard for fashioning a "reasonable" emissions cap
in the alleged climate-based public nuisance. For instance, examining Tennessee Copper 7-in which a smeltery's noxious fumes had damaged
adjacent lands-as an emblematic attempt at analogy, the following factual
adjustments would be required for it to meaningfully guide adjudication of
American Electric Power: (a) the smeltery's emissions had never before
been considered harmful or nuisance-presenting; (b) those emissions contributed to a complex global dynamic that hurt the plaintiff, not through its
direct effects, but by exacerbating a natural phenomenon, giving rise to
other conditions that, in turn, made injuries unpredictably more frequent and
severe; (c) the emissions had the potential to spawn processes that, once
some internal threshold of emissions concentration were crossed in the
plaintiff's territory, would initiate a distinct process of closed-system generation of the same emissions by the plaintiff's land itself; and (d) billions of
diverse other emitters (i.e., not just smelteries) around the world, in addition
to natural processes, contributed to that same harm through several kinds of
fumes bearing an identical effect.
American Electric Power thus defies precedent in sheer quantitative
complexity while also posing crucial qualitative differences. GHG emissions
are not inherently noxious; climate injury causation is not direct, immediate,
or obvious; and the diffuse, global nature of climate harms makes them untraceable to particular sources, natural or anthropogenic. Rather, the
centuries-lagging, feedback-fueled, statistical harms present a case that is
86.

The Kivalina court said:

While a water pollution claim typically involves a discrete, geographically definable waterway, Plaintiffs' global warming claim is based on the emission of greenhouse gases from
innumerable sources located throughout the world and affecting the entire planet ....

[More-

over,] the discharge in excess of the amount permitted is presumed harmful . .. [whereas] the
harm from global warming involves a series of events disconnected from the discharge itself.
In a global warming scenario, emitted greenhouse gases combine with other gases in the atmosphere which in turn results in the planet retaining heat, which in turn causes the ice caps to
melt and the oceans to rise, which in turn [causes harmful effects].
Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 875-76 (2009).

87.

206 U.S. 230 (1907).
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alien in kind, not just more complicated in number. Tort case law simply
does not provide a suitable framework for climate nuisance adjudication."
Rather, asking a court to navigate the novel dynamics of American Electric
Power "casts [the judge] forth upon a sea of imponderables, and asks [him
or her] to make determinations that not even . . .experts can agree upon." 9
General statements of tort principles fail to shore up the inadequacies of
the cited case law. Note that "the evaluation of a nuisance claim is not focused entirely on the unreasonableness of the harm," but rather involves
balancing "the utility and benefit of the alleged nuisance against the harm
caused."" Accordingly, a court would be forced to adjudge the viability of
low-emissions energy production (required for the defendants to comport
with an emissions cap while still meeting consumer demands) by trying to
weigh the costs and uncertainties of alternative energies against the benefits
of lessening the statistical risk of injuries stemming from an enhanced
greenhouse effect.9' As the Kivalina court recognized, there exist no "particular judicially discoverable and manageable standards [for] rendering a
decision that is principled, rational, and based upon reasoned distinctions"
92
for this kind of policy balancing, which defies nuisance law and should be
relegated to the political branches.93 In American Electric Power, Baker un-

manageability arises from the notion that "[n]o test ... can possibly be
successful unless one knows what he is testing for"94-here, what "reason15
ableness" means.

88. Non-nuisance environmental cases are also distinguishable. For instance, in Barasichwhere private plaintiffs sought damages from energy companies whose pipeline-building and exploration activities allegedly exacerbated Hurricane Katrina's damage to coastal lands-the court
expressly distinguished American Electric Power in the political question context, both because the
request for injunctive relief in American Electric Power made the case more legislative in nature and
because the Barasich claims were based on negligence rather than nuisance. Barasich v. Columbia
Gulf Transmission Co., 467 F. Supp. 2d 676, 685-86 (E.D. La. 2006).
89.

Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 290 (2004).

90. Kivalina, 663 F Supp. 2d at 874 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B(l)
(1979)). The reasonableness reasoning of Kivalina, which contemplated damages for relief, similarly applies to the question in American Electric Power, notwithstanding the fact that the latter case
is distinguishable in contemplating injunctive relief. Indeed, courts have found prayers for injunctions to be less manageable than actions for damages. E.g., Gordon v. Texas, 153 F3d 190, 195 (5th
Cir. 1998). So if anything, the present point is strengthened by the decision.
91.

See Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 874.

92.

Id. at 875.

93. Indeed, scholars agree that "the political branches should solve the climate change problem,' and that "'nuisance litigation is ill-suited to other than small-scale, incidental, localized,
scientifically uncomplicated pollution problems.'" Zasloff, supra note 7, at 1829 (quoting JESSE
DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 665 (6th ed. 2006)); see also Eric Biber, Climate Change and Back-

lash, 17 N.YU. ENVTL. L.J. 1295, 1310-11 ("The very fact that environmentalists, major
policymakers, Congress, and other actors are placing enormous political capital and energy into
developing a regulatory system indicates a strong lack of faith that liability solutions will be the
primary solution to the climate change policy.").
94.

Vieth, 541 U.S. at 297.

95. See infra notes 101-113 for further discussion of the problems with finding a reasonableness standard in American Electric Power.
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The argument for second-factor nonjusticiability is not just that injunctive climate nuisance claims are complicated-courts make difficult
96
decisions all the time. Rather, it is that no standard exists on which to base
a decision. Public nuisance common law does not answer climate questions
the way it answers questions about traditional pollution. Like the situation in
Vieth, a court, lacking the institutional capacity to prudentially fashion relief
standards sua sponte, cannot point to legal authorities that guide the policy
balancing necessary to fashion relief in this controversy. Neither judicial
precedents nor tort principles provide courts with climate change resolution
standards that are sufficiently "principled, rational, and based on reasoned
distinctions."" Absent "comprehensive and neutral principles" for emissions
reasonableness, the prudential concerns of the second Baker factor favor
dismissal.99
3. The Third Baker Factor:Initial Policy Determinations

The third Baker factor, regarding the impossibility of making initial policy determinations not for judicial discretion, should also render injunctive
climate nuisance claims nonjusticiable. This factor acknowledges the impropriety of courts promulgating decisions they are ill-equipped to make,
and for which they have no political mandate. Third-factor inquiry may
hinge on some of the same questions as the second, regarding manageability.m Under the third factor, though, courts must ask whether they can
adjudicate without effectively charting a new course of action that should be
navigated by Congress or the executive (as opposed to whether existing legal authority guides adjudication in a sufficiently principled manner).
Analytically, a judge must decide both whether a policy determination is
initial and whether it is within the judiciary's decisional purview. Adjudicating claims like American Electric Power implicates several initial policy
determinations, including, at least: What should the aggregate cap for GHG

96. I acknowledge LaTourette's contention that "courts have created new standards for providing remedies throughout our jurisprudential history." LaTourette, supra note 7, at 265. This Part
argues, though, that American Electric Power's claims push beyond the prudential boundary of
judicial innovation in remedy fashioning.
97. See Barkow, supra note 38, at 329 ("There are also some questions that may be better
suited to the political branches because of institutional competence to gather and interpret the facts
that are central to those questions.").
98. Cf Vieth, 541 U.S. at 278. LaTourette contends that "courts are uniquely situated" to
pronounce unreasonable interference in climate-related public nuisance claims and must be allowed
to proceed past the pleadings and into discovery. LaTourette, supra note 7, at 261-62 (downplaying
"the breadth of these cases or the logistical difficulties they present" because "[tihe tort of public
nuisance provides the courts the legal tools necessary to make a reasoned decision"). This Part argues, however, that conceptualizing American Electric Power as just another tort is conclusory and
would spur unprecedented, institutionally inappropriate judicial management.
99.

Vieth, 541 U.S. at 306-07 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

100. For instance, in American Electric Power, second-factor problems with fashioning a
reasonableness standard, see supra Section II.C.2, also arise under the third Baker factor vis-h-vis
determining an aggregate emissions cap, see infra notes 102-110 and accompanying text.
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emissions be? What entities should be targeted in the emissions "stream"?
And, what remedy is appropriate for achieving emissions reductions?
Perhaps the most significant initial policy determination the court would
be required to make is the determination of a reasonable aggregate emissions cap-a necessary consideration in deciding reasonableness in nuisance
adjudication. True, the court could refrain from expressly naming any national or global emissions limit while setting a "reasonable" cap on
defendants' emissions. But it would be impossible for judges to evaluate the
reasonableness of individual emissions without promulgating an aggregate
limit behind the published opinion. It would be meaningless to label an individual contribution as "too much" without determining maximum
. . 101
acceptable aggregate emissions.
That a court would need to conjure a figure for maximum aggregate
emissions follows from two principles. First, some reasonable output level
must exist, since some emission of GHGs is necessary for a functioning society. Second, only worldwide aggregate emissions matter in calculating the
gravity of harms caused by global warming. That is, emissions' origin is
irrelevant to the manifestation of climate change, which results from the
dispersal and accumulation of GHGs throughout the atmosphere.102 TO illuStrate, global warming would manifest no more severely in Connecticut if a
ton of CO2 came from Hartford than if it came from Beijing. Therefore, the
climate harm caused by an emitter-and hence that emitter's reasonableness-derives from the fraction of global aggregate emissions that it
contributes. Stating in a vacuum that some defendants' emissions are unreasonable is analogous to saying that a radio is too loud without reference to
where it is being played, who is listening, the reason it is being played, and
so on. 03 A court would thus logically have to make, at least implicitly, an
initial finding regarding aggregate emissions in order to set a reasonable,
proportion-based injunctive cap.
That necessary determination of an aggregate cap would be both initial
and inappropriate for the judiciary. With regards to initial-ness, although
Congress and the executive branch have already made the general determi-

101. Opinions vary regarding acceptable levels, due not only to scientific uncertainty about
what atmospheric concentration of GHGs is necessary to avoid catastrophic change and what annual
emissions levels would stabilize at that concentration, but also due to questions of economic feasibility and balancing. See IPCC, Synthesis Report, supra note 1, at 44-70.
102. William D. Nordhaus, To Tax or Not to Tax: Alternative Approaches to Slowing Global
Warming, I REv. ENVTL. EcON. & PoL'Y 26, 30 (2007).
103. Distinguish climate nuisance claims from nuisance situations involving loud noises or
noxious fumes, for example, where the degree of injury also depends on, among other things, the
location of the alleged nuisance. In those cases, the proximity of the defendant's activity influences
how much harm or interference the plaintiff experiences, so a court could justifiably say that a given
amount of noise, fumes, etc., is reasonable somewhere but excessive elsewhere. See, e.g., Spur Indus., Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 494 P.2d 700 (Ariz. 1972) (enjoining the operation of a feedlot,
but forcing the plaintiff to pay relocation costs, where encroachment by the plaintiff housing development into a previously rural area made the feedlot's activities no longer reasonable). In contrast,
the only relationship between GHG emissions and climate change-and hence, the degree of the
alleged nuisance's interference with a public right-is volume.
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nation that climate change is detrimental,'0 neither has come close to identifying a figure for an aggregate emissions cap.'os Even less clear is how such
a cap should translate into "reasonable" emissions allowances among various constituencies. For instance, is it reasonable for states with greater
dependence on dirty-burning coal to emit more than states that can more
readily utilize cleaner natural gas or renewable energy sources like wind,
solar, and water? Is it reasonable for older power plants to emit more than
newer ones, in light of cleaner modem technologies for electricity production? Is it reasonable for a utility in a poor area to emit more than one in an
affluent area in order to provide cheaper energy to its consumers, given the
regressive nature of pricier clean energy?'
Having established that the implicit cap-setting policy determination
would be initial, it is also one that is inappropriate for the courts to make.
The judiciary lacks the institutional mandate to credibly weigh the science
against the array of economic tradeoffs that different caps would imply, given that such tradeoffs would involve policy-based value judgments that
should be reserved for the politically accountable branches.o7 Also, while
this Note does not suggest that courts should not hear cases involving complex scientific issues, the tremendous scientific complexity of climate
change certainly does not help the case for justiciability of climate-based
claims. That is, as a supplement to the values-based separation-of-powers
argument for judicial abstention,' 8 the fact that litigating climate suits implies global scientific and economic factfinding so intricate that even UN
panels (with far more resources and expertise than the courts) struggle to
assess the data and weigh competing values further counsels for judicial
abstention."

104.

See supra notes 15-16, 19-21 and accompanying text.

105. There isn't even consensus regarding what long-run atmospheric concentration of GHGs
would avoid catastrophic global warming-a logical prerequisite for setting emissions caps meant to
keep us below that level. See IPCC, Synthesis Report, supra note 1, at 44-54. But see Connecticut v.
Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 331 (2d Cir. 2009) (implying that the fact that Congress and the
executive do not favor increasing GHG emissions negates initial-ness under the third Baker factor).
106. See Robert N. Stavins, A Meaningful U.S. Cap-and-Trade System to Address Climate
Change, 32 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 293, 337-44 (2008) (considering the distributional concerns of
allocating emissions allowances under cap-and-trade--concems that would also apply if a court
were to limit emissions rights with an injunction, given the analogous capping effect).
107. See Barkow, supra note 38, at 329-30 (acknowledging that the political question doctrine
"reflects not only the structure and text of the Constitution, but a very pragmatic determination
that some questions should be decided by the political branches because of their accountability and
institutional competence").
108. In other words, that judicially unprecedented, values-based decisions-such as reasonableness in the context of GHG emissions-should be relegated to the political branches.
109. Cf Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 290 (2004) (finding nonjusticiability where adjudication would "[ask a judge] to make determinations that not even . . . experts can agree upon"). The
IPCC Synthesis Report illustrates the complexities and tentativeness of climate change projections-notwithstanding years of research and input from thousands of researchers and policymakers.
See IPCC, Synthesis Report, supra note 1, at 7 ("Because understanding of some important effects
driving sea level rise is too limited, this report does not assess the likelihood, nor provide a best
estimate or an upper bound for sea level rise.").
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Similarly concerned about institutional competence, the Tenth Circuit
found Schroder v. Bush to present a political question when independent
farmers sought to force the executive branch to adopt policies more favorable to small-scale agriculture."o The court explained that it was employing
the nonjusticiability doctrine as a tool for maintenance of governmental order.'

"'

The third Baker factor was implicated, among others, because the

judiciary is "ill-equipped to make highly technical, complex, and on-going
decisions regarding how to maintain market conditions, negotiate trade
agreements, and control currency," whereas "[tihe political branches ...
retain just this sort of institutional competence."" 2 Like the various policy
questions posed by Schroder,"' the effective regulation of the energy policies of the largest utilities companies in America demands initial
determinations and policy balancing better left to Congress or the executive
branch, given courts' lack of both accountability and expertise." 4
Another initial policy determination implicated by climate change litigation involves which entities should be targeted for emissions regulation."One ongoing debate concerns whether "upstream" emissions sources (e.g.,
coal producers) or "downstream" emitters (e.g., residences) would more
efficiently bear liability."' Further, Congress is debating whether sensitive
110.

263 F.3d 1169 (10th Cir. 2001).

Ill.

Id. at 1175 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 215 (1962)).

112.

Id.

113. Schroder is distinguishable from American Electric Power in that Schrder's contemplation of " 're-formulat[ing] national policies' by requiring the federal government to alter many
federal programs" is beyond the scope of American Electric Power, in which a ruling for the plaintiffs would not require such explicit legislative or administrative policy changing. Borissov, supra
note 7, at 445 (quoting Schroder, 263 F.3d at 1176) (footnote omitted). However, Borissov's excerpt
refers to the Schroder plaintiffs' request for a national emergency declaration, which was denied on
the basis of the second and sixth Baker factors. Schroder, 263 F.3d at 1176. Schrder's third-factor
discussion of institutional incompetence with respect to policy balancing remains relevant to American Electric Power while not formulating a national scheme, the court would certainly be making
initial determinations appropriate for the political branches.
114. See Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 875 (N.D. Cal.
2009) ("The resolution of Plaintiffs' nuisance claim requires balancing the social utility of Defendants' conduct with the harm it inflicts. That process, by definition, entails a determination of what
would have been an acceptable limit on the level of greenhouse gases emitted by Defendants.");
California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 WL 2726871, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17,
2007) (concluding that the court would be required "to balance the competing interests of reducing
global warming emissions and the interests of advancing and preserving economic and industrial
development," which it found to be "the type of initial policy determination to be made by the political branches, and not [the judiciary]"); see also Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 E Supp.
2d 265, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (identifying the American Electric Power defendants as the top CO,emitting utilities in the United States).
115. Granted, in an immediate sense it is the plaintiffs, not the courts, who choose the defendants in a lawsuit. Nevertheless, a climate nuisance court implicitly authorizes such quasi-regulatory
litigation by entertaining the plaintiffs' claims, thereby involving policy determinations.
116. See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & David M. Uhlmann, Combating Global Climate
Change: Why a Carbon Tax Is a Better Response to Global Warming Than Cap and Trade, 28 STAN.
ENVTL. L.J. 3, 31-32 (2009) (discussing the merits of upstream versus downstream regulation under
carbon tax and cap-and-trade systems); Stavins, supra note 106, at 309-13 (advocating upstream
cap-and-trade regulation); Zasloff, supra note 7, at 1861 (arguing that the climate change nuisance
suits have unwisely targeted "midstream" GHG gas emitters). The district court in American Elec-
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industries and regions should receive special treatment due to fairness and
economic reasons. 17 As summarized by the Kivalina court, "virtually everyone on Earth is responsible on some level for contributing to such
emissions," and, as such, "the allocation of fault-and cost-of global
warming is a matter appropriately left for determination by the executive or
legislative branch in the first instance.""" The political branches, not the
courts, possess the mandate and the expertise to decide where to place emissions liability, which clearly bears upon the prudence of enjoining the
American Electric Power utilities.

Yet another initial policy determination concerns how emissions abatement should be pursued, which is implicated in a court's choice between
injunctive relief and damages in climate litigation." 9 Congress is contemplating various cap-and-trade schemes-theoretically more akin to
injunctions, since an emitter's harm-causing activity has a definite
ceiling-though there are competing proposals for tax mechanisms-more
like damages, since an emitter can choose to emit without limit if it pays the
consequences.120 Further, the EPA is in the initial stages of regulating GHG
emissions under the CAA, which would include both equitable elementssince rules and entitlement-like allowances would issue-and legal elements-since statutory violations could trigger fines.121 Congress and the
executive have not made an initial policy determination about relief form.
Those politically accountable branches, with their superior capacities to
consider
22 complex incentive programs, should be the ones to make that deci-

sion. 1

Initial policy determinations should not be conflated with issues of preemption and preclusion. Erroneously, under the auspices of evaluating the
third Baker factor, the Second Circuit posed the question of whether legislative silence categorically bars federal common law nuisance suits.123
tric Power recognized similar questions. E.g., 406 F. Supp. 2d at 273 ("[Slhould the societal costs of
reducing such emissions be borne by just a segment of the electricity-generating industry and their
industrial and other consumers? Should those costs be spread across the entire electricity-generating
industry (including utilities in the plaintiff States)? Other industries?").
117.

See supra notes 11, 106 and accompanying text.

118.

663 F. Supp. 2d at 877.

119. See Zasloff, supra note 7, at 1838-43 (discussing the important advantages, disadvantages, and policy implications of this choice).
120. E.g., Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 116 (arguing that a carbon tax would be preferable to cap-and-trade regulation).
121.

See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.

122. This determination is probably the most marginal, for political question purposes, of
those discussed. That is, it involves the least potential for policy-related ripple effects, and the judiciary possesses more relative competence in this matter. Also, the litigants, not the courts, frame the
relief choice, though the courts are the ultimate enforcers of it. In any event, this determination is
secondary to those identified previously, which should be sufficient in themselves for third-Bakerfactor nonjusticiability. Even accepting judicial discretion to decide the form of relief, a court still
could not avoid, for instance, making an initial policy determination about an aggregate emissions
cap.
123. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 330-31 (2d Cir. 2009). It is true that
legislative silence does not necessarily preempt federal common law suits. City of Milwaukee v.
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However, the third factor does not contemplate preemption and preclusion.
Preemption in a political question sense is relegated to the first Baker factor,
i.e., whether an issue is textually committed to another branch. Meanwhile,
preclusion would occur if GHG emissions were regulated by statute and that
statute dictated that compliance with it would preclude suit. The appropriate
third-factor inquiry is not whether silence affirmatively supplants all claims.
Rather, the question is whether the judiciary, faced with the other branches'
silence, can prudently make an initial policy determination. 24 The Second
Circuit did not address that consideration, holding simply that the plaintiffs'
common law causes of action were not precluded. Had it engaged in appropriate self-evaluation, the court should have concluded that the
aforementioned requisite initial determinations are outside its institutional
purview.
The Second Circuit oversimplified our most pressing global environmental challenge when it summarily stated that American Electric Power
was an "ordinary tort suit" for which no initial policy determinations are
required because "[similar] claims have been adjudicated in federal courts
for over a century."15 The court used "claims" to refer sweepingly to public
nuisance suits generally, not to climate change nuisance in particular. Yet as
the foregoing analysis has shown, the relevant inquiry must hone in on the
climate context. The precedent relied upon by the Second Circuit does not
change the fact that the adjudication of cases like American Electric Power
will require policy determinations that are both initial and inappropriate for
judicial pronouncement.

III.

CASES LIKE AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER SHOULD BE DISMISSED
FOR LACK OF REDRESSABILITY

Political question scrutiny aside, public nuisance suits seeking emissions
caps should be dismissed for lack of redressability-a required element of
constitutional standing. Granting an injunction on emissions would provide
hollow, practically meaningless relief, and relief would be conjectural anyway. Section A of this Part outlines the analytical framework for
redressability in climate nuisance cases. Section B continues with American
Electric Power as an example to ground redressability analysis. It addresses
line-drawing difficulties posed by the case, arguing that finding redressability in American Electric Power would render the requirement merely
semantic. This is true given the at-best nominal relief the plaintiffs could
gain through an injunction-a problem accentuated by the unprincipled
joining of defendants in the case. Finally, Section C argues that, even putting aside all line-drawing problems, enjoining the defendants would
Illinois, 406 U.S. 91, 103-07 (1972). The Second Circuit was reacting, with this line of reasoning,
to the district court's framing of the issue. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 330. Still, if the lower
court reached its third-factor Baker conclusion based on skewed preemption logic, the Second Circuit should have corrected it without embarking on an off-point Baker analysis.
124.

Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).

125.

582 F.3d at 331.
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provide only speculative relief for the plaintiffs, so redressability is not satisfied.
A. The ProperRedressability Standardfor Climate Nuisance Claims

Redressability is one of the judge-made standing requirements derived
from Article III of the Constitution.126 The Supreme Court interpreted Article
III in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife to generally require that "it must be

'likely,' as opposed to merely 'speculative,' that the [alleged] injury will be
'redressed by a favorable decision.' ,127 Lujan provides the standing framework for climate nuisance cases. Massachusetts v. EPA, however, causes
some confusion for applying Lujan's "likely, as opposed to merely speculative" standard in climate change nuisance cases.
Massachusetts contained two redressability-related standards, one inapposite and one arguably relevant to climate nuisance claims. The first was its
broader finding that the state plaintiffs should receive "special solicitude"
for each standing prong; this does not apply to climate nuisance cases.128
More ambiguous in its applicability to climate nuisance cases, though, is
Massachusetts's statement that, for redressability in particular, it sufficed
that "[a] reduction in domestic emissions would slow the pace of global
emissions increases" and "[the risk of global warming] would be reduced to
some extent . . . .""9 The ambiguity stems from the fact that the majority in

Massachusetts invested much in discussing the physical harms of climate
change, though the resolution of the controversy hinged on procedural rights
126. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 63 (3d ed. 2006). Other standing prongs
include the injury requirement, the causation requirement, and the zone-of-interests test. Id. The
Supreme Court once treated causation and redressability as a single test. See Warth v. Seldin, 422
U.S. 490, 505 (1975). It seems logical that an injury caused by a defendant would be redressed by
granting relief from the defendant's injurious behavior, and commentators have argued that separating the two prongs is nonsensical. CHEMERINSKY, supra, at 82. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has
counted causation and redressability as distinct prerequisites. E.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). This Note addresses the redressability prong partly because opinions
and commentary have focused less on it than on causation. More importantly, this Note's argument
regarding the speculative nature of relief that an injunction could offer falls under a redressability
framework. See infra Section IIL.C.
127.
(1976)).

504 U.S. at 560-61 (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38, 43

128. Massachusetts v. EPA, a landmark Supreme Court decision, might intuitively seem to
provide the analytical framework for standing in a case like American Electric Power because it
likewise involved state plaintiffs and was related to climate change. 549 U.S. 497 (2007); see also
supra text accompanying notes 17-19. Such an intuition would be wrong, however. The 5-4 Massachusetts majority found that states' procedural rights under the CAA, coupled with their "special
position and interest" as quasi-sovereigns, qualified them for "special solicitude" in standing analysis. 549 U.S. at 517-20. Under this more lenient standard, the state plaintiffs only needed to show
"some possibility that the requested relief [would] prompt the injury-causing party to reconsider the
decision that allegedly harmed [them]." Id. at 518. However, Massachusetts's "special solicitude" is
inapposite to climate nuisance suits because the nuisance plaintiffs, even if they are states, do not
assert a special procedural right as quasi-sovereigns but rather sue under a general public right in a
proprietary capacity as landowners. The Second Circuit, recognizing the absence of a special procedural right in American Electric Power, accepted Lujan for its standing analysis. 582 F.3d at 33840.
129.

549 U.S. at 526.
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granted to quasi-sovereigns by statute.3 oAs a result, it is unclear how much
the Court's redressability finding relied on the special procedural nature of
that case-and as a corollary, how applicable Massachusetts's redressability
language is to climate nuisance suits.'
This Note accepts that Massachusetts's language about redressability
vis-A-vis climate harm itself is persuasive, even if properly classified as dicta."3 Massachusetts does not supercede Lujan: the former simply identified
the degree of relief necessary for finding climate change redressability,
while the latter identifies the requisite likelihood that granting relief will
redress the harm. Section B of this Part proceeds to question the appropriateness of a literal adoption of Massachusetts's redressability standard in
nuisance claims. Next, Section C argues that, even adopting a truly literal
interpretation of Massachusetts, Lujan's requirement that even small
amounts of relief be "'likely,' as opposed to merely 'speculative' "" still
undermines a finding of redressability in a case like American Electric Power.
B. Problems with Line Drawing, Defendant Joining,
and Nominal Relief

Finding the injuries alleged in climate nuisance suits to be redressable
with an injunction would render the redressability requirement semantically
hollow and practically meaningless, since plaintiffs can gain only nominal
relief from the climate harms at hand. Once again, this Note examines
American Electric Power as a case in point. The plaintiffs' stated injuries in
that case are the harmful manifestations of climate change itself, like loss of
coastal property. In alleging causation, the plaintiffs claimed that the defendants collectively emit 650 million tons of CO, annually.134 In 2005,'" global
130. Strictly speaking, the injury in Massachusetts was not the harmful manifestation of climate change itself, but rather the improper shirking of EPA duties pursuant to the CAA. See id. at
518 (stating that a litigant vested with a procedural right has standing if the requested relief might
prompt the agency to reconsider its decision); id. at 521 ("EPA's steadfast refusal to regulate greenhouse gas emissions presents a risk of harm to Massachusetts . . . ."); id. at 525 (stating that
redressability depended on whether the Court had "jurisdiction to decide whether EPA has a duty [to
regulate GHGs]"). That is, redressability was satisfied in Massachusetts because a decision forcing
the EPA to ground its decision in the statute would redress the injury of improper procedural abstention.
131. Technically, since climate harms and emissions reductions were not the case's injury and
remedy, respectively, Massachusetts's language about climate harm redressability, 549 U.S. at 52425, should be dicta.
132. This Note questions the precedential value of Massachusetts's climate harm redressability analysis but will not dismiss it in blanket fashion. Supreme Court precedent cannot be ignored in
this context, especially given that the Second Circuit invoked Massachusetts's redressability-specific
reasoning in American Electric Power. 582 F.3d at 309, 344, 347-49.
133.

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992).

134. Am. Elec. Power, 582 F.3d at 314. The defendants are not alleged to have emitted other
kinds of GHGs.
135. The year that the American Electric Power complaint was filed. Connecticut v. Am. Elec.
Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
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human-related emissions'" hovered around 55 billion tons.'37 In effect, the
plaintiffs alleged that the defendants contributed approximately 1.18% of
worldwide anthropogenic GHG emissions." The defendants' 1.18% proportion of worldwide emissions is diminishing and will continue to shrink
significantly as developing countries' emissions increase relative to those of
the developed world." 9 For relief, the plaintiffs seek an injunction capping
the defendants' emissions at some unspecified amount, plus additional
yearly reductions.'" It seems doubtful that any injunction, if granted, would
demand more than a 15% emissions reduction.141 In sum, the most that the

136. These emissions encompass not only fossil fuel use but also other activities such as agriculture and deforestation. This global figure is the relevant one in considering how much an
injunction would remedy the plaintiffs' climate injuries because emissions disperse throughout
Earth's atmosphere and contribute to a global phenomenon that does not vary with GHG origin.
Nordhaus, supra note 102, at 30 ("Because global warming is a global public good, the key environmental issue is global emissions .... Climate change depends only upon total GHG emissions
and the time path of emissions, not on the geographic location of emissions."); IPCC, Synthesis
Report, supra note 1, at 36-37 (considering only global emissions as the driving force behind climate change). Thus, in considering redressability, it does not matter that the defendants produce a
larger proportion of regionalemissions, even if that intuitively seems pertinent to fairness.
137. IPCC, Synthesis Report, supra note 1, at 36. This figure of 55 billion tons of GHGs
measured in equivalent units of CO, represents the approximate US-ton equivalent of 50 billion
metric tons, which this Note takes as a one-year extrapolation of the billion-tons-added-per-year
trend from 2000 (44.7 billion) to 2004 (49 billion). (Note the unit conversion from metric tons: I
metric ton = 1.1023 US tons.)
138. The 1.18% figure is the defendants' share of emissions (650 million tons of CO) divided
by global emissions (55 billion tons of CO,-equivalent). For present purposes, this Note will consider this as equivalent to saying that the defendants caused 1.18% of Earth's current climate
change. This assumption is contestable, but the IPCC has concluded with at least 90% certainty that
the current phase of climate change cannot be attributed to natural processes. IPCC, Synthesis Report, supra note 1, at 38-40. In any case, to the extent that climate change could be blamed partially
on natural processes, doing so would diminish the defendants' proportionate contribution to the
harm, thereby strengthening this Part's argument regarding the nominal nature of potential redressability.
139. The Energy Information Administration has projected that whereas US energy-related
CO, emissions will grow by an average of 0.3% annually from 2006 to 2030, corresponding emissions from developing countries (including, most significantly, China and India) will increase at an
average rate of 2.2% annually. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, INTERNATIONAL
111 tbl.15 (2009), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/
OUTLOOK 2009, at
ENERGY
oiaf/ieo/pdf/0484(2009).pdf. By 2030, developing-world CO, emissions will exceed those of the
developed world by 77%, whereas in 2006 that number was only 14%. Id. at 109. As a proxy for
relative US influence, these projections indicate that the American Electric Power defendants'
causal link to climate change will continue to become even less significant.
140.

Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 318 (2d Cir. 2009).

141. In reality, it would probably be less than 15%, considering practicalities such as technological feasibility of meeting short-term energy needs through alternative energies, and the initial
price-raising effects (e.g., the financial burden on consumers and resultant political backlash) implied by low-emissions energy mandates. The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, for instance,
mandates only a 10% CO, emissions reduction below 2009 levels by the year 2018. RGGI C02
Budget Trading Program, supra note 22. A 15% reduction is a conservative estimate for an American Electric Power hypothetical. One might then point to the plaintiffs' prayer for subsequent
reductions, which could exceed the 15% figure, but those reductions would be more than offset, in
the emissions proportionality context, by the developing world's ballooning emissions.
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plaintiffs could gain from a favorable decision is less than a 0.2% redress142-a figure that will drop farther in the future.
It is unprecedented in public nuisance litigation to entertain a claim that
sues for equitable relief from less than 0.2% of the nuisance. This is akin to
a nuisance suit against someone who dumps a single can of paint into a river
where a dozen factories discharge their waste (statutory preemption issues
aside). Another analogy would involve an excessive noise claim where an
injunction might make the plaintiff's evenings less than 0.2% quieter. Admittedly, Massachusetts undercuts this point, since the climate-harm redress
in that case would have been small, too, at a little less than 1%.14 Crucially,
however, the small degree of redress in Massachusetts satisfied the majority
in part because federal agencies tackle regulatory hurdles incrementally.
There, the EPA could acceptably "whittle away" at global warming, refining
its approach as it adopts more stringent regulation.'" Yet in American Electric Power-a case between parties in private capacities-the logic of
agency experimentation and refining is inapposite. That is, a sub-0.2%
causal reduction either redresses the alleged injuries in American Electric
Power or does not; it would not spur a domino effect of additional redress.
Granting relief in nuisance cases could not prompt the defendants in these
cases to initiate procedures that could require nationally systemic GHG reductions and transform the federal regulatory paradigm, as in
Massachusetts. This crucial distinction relates back to the problem of neglecting the procedural nature of the harm and remedy in Massachusetts.145
Concededly, if we accept Massachusetts'sredressability holding to stand
for the proposition that any slowing of the pace of global warming is a sufficient remedy for Article III purposes, then redressability would be satisfied
in American Electric Power,146 provided that an emissions cap on the defendants did indeed reduce overall emissions (an assumption challenged
below). In practice, however, such a literal holding would lead to absurd
consequences and should not be allowed. At one logical extreme, it would
allow a single person to be sued under public nuisance, even if that person's
emissions contributed 0.0001% to climate change. After all, an injunction
halting John Doe from driving his car to work "would slow the pace of
global emissions increases." Yet no one could argue that suing Mr. Doe
would "redress" a climate-related harm.
While the single emitter extreme is clearly unacceptable, the idea of
joining unrelated emitter upon emitter to a complaint until some magic thre142. This figure results from multiplying the defendants' contribution to the harm (1.18%) by
the reduction proportion granted by a theoretical injunction (0.15).
143. The Supreme Court in Massachusetts noted that the source in question (US motor vehicles) contributed 1.7 billion tons of CO,, Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 524 (2007), or about
two and one-half times the amount in American Electric Power, see supra note 134 and accompanying text. Notably, those emissions would be even less significant in terms of world proportionality
given the rise in global emissions since that decision. See supra note 139.
144.

See 549 U.S. at 524.

145.

See supra notes 130-131 and accompanying text.

146.

See Borissov, supra note 7 at 437-38.
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shold of remedial sufficiency is reached also seems unsatisfactory. In
American Electric Power, the choice of defendants is not accidental; they
are all utility companies, and the plaintiffs allege that they comprise "the
five largest emitters of carbon dioxide in the United States." 47 Beyond that,
however, the defendants are unrelated. For instance, the plaintiffs and defendants are not situated in a single region.1' Rather, the litigants are
scattered throughout the United States, with the opposing parties overlapping geographically in only one state.149 Allowing such arbitrary joinder of
parties (after all, why not add the sixth- through tenth-largest utilities, along
with ExxonMobil and other oil and gas giants?) would permit litigants, in
tandem with their forum court, to function as a quasi-EPA. In effect, a court
could promulgate an emissions standard for as many power plants, oil refineries, and coal mines as could be made party to the lawsuit by the plaintiffs
or even by the defendants.5 o This defendant-adding conundrum serves to
further distinguish Massachusetts and its acceptably small degree of redressability: in that case, redressability was linked to a lone defendant (the
EPA), whereas in American Electric Power, it is spread over five emitters.
C. Line Drawing Aside, the Speculative Nature of Relief
Should Negate Redressability

Setting aside line-drawing problems' 5 ' and accepting a minimal-slowing
standard for redressability, climate nuisance plaintiffs cannot satisfy Lujan's
requirement that relief from the alleged injury be "'likely,' as opposed to
merely 'speculative.' "152 Lujan held that where agency-defendants supplied
only a fraction of the funding for projects causing the injury in question,
redressability was not met because it was "conjectural whether the
147.

Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).

148. Once again, however, even if all the litigants were situated in a single region, that would
be beside the point. As much as it might intuitively feel more appropriate to sue emitters within a
geographic unit where they contribute much or most of the local emissions, causation of climate
change does not turn on emissions' origin. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
149. Thomas W. Merrill, Global Warming as a PublicNuisance, 30 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 293,
331-32 (2005) (noting that only one power plant from one of the defendants is located in one of the
plaintiff states); see also supra note 27.
150. With American Electric Power proceeding to the merits, it will be interesting to see if the
defendants-not wanting to suffer injunctive caps that do not burden their competitors-can successfully seek to join other utilities or any other emitters as third-party defendants. See Friendswood
Dev. Co. v. Smith-Southwest Indus., 576 S.W.2d 21 (Tex. 1978) (permitting a development company-sued for nuisance and negligence by landowners who alleged that the company's extraction
of groundwater caused subsidence of their lands-to join as third-party defendants numerous other
parties alleged to be withdrawing groundwater from the same general area). If so, concerns about
this kind of line drawing would be heightened even more.
151. Judges are line drawers, after all. The preceding discussion simply stresses that calling
the harms in American Electric Power "redressed" would constitute such a semantic stretchconsidering both the practically meaningless level of relief and the arbitrariness of defendant joining-as to merit serious reflection about what limits, if any, we will recognize with respect to
standing in this context.
152.

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
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nonagency activity that affectled the plaintiffs would] be altered or affected"
by enjoining the agency. 5 In other words, it was uncertain whether the
plaintiffs' harm would subside as a result of the prayed-for relief, since the
injurious projects may have continued even without the defendants' funding.
The claim was therefore nonredressable, so the plaintiffs lacked standing.
Lujan's holding that uncertainty of relief can defeat standing applies to cases like American Electric Power because aggregate emissions would remain
unaffected if the defendants' present customers switch to uncapped GHGproducing energy sources.
Capping the emissions of just a few, albeit massive, utilities can offer
only a speculative reduction in net GHG emissions, given the shifts in energy consumption liable to result from consumers shunning higher energy
prices.'" First, in places where competition exists between utilities, present
consumers of capped. utilities would be impelled to switch to purchasing
from uncapped utilities because those unconstrained competitors could offer
cheaper energy. Second, in places where a capped utility monopolizes the
local power market, the aforementioned economic incentive (i.e., the draw
towards cheaper, dirtier power) would tend to push current and prospective
consumers of capped utilities into locations with uncapped utilities. This
second dynamic, sometimes called "leakage," is especially crucial in the
industrial context due to businesses' relative mobility, the great proportion
of emissions they contribute, and their tendency to relocate where production is cheapest (including overseas).15 Ultimately, since consumers would
gravitate towards uncapped power sources, aggregate emissions might not
decrease, although the defendants' role in creating them would. Accordingly, the same (or conceivably greater) overall contribution to climate
change would ensue, and the plaintiffs' injuries would not be redressed at
all. At best, then, the chance of redress is conjectural.
153.

Id. at 571.

154. To satisfy an injunction, a capped emitter would have to choose between generating less
power with current technologies or implementing costly technologies to produce fewer emissions
per unit of energy (or some combination of the two). Either method would raise prices: the former
because diminished supply results in higher prices (assuming constant or growing demand); the
latter because increased production costs are passed along to consumers. A third option for a capped
defendant would be to purchase energy from cleaner sources and sell it to consumers-but this
would just make it a middleman peddler of already more expensive clean energy. See Jay B. Wiley,
Cap-and-Trade Spells Economic Disasterfor America's Poor, 12 SCHOLAR 267, 278-84 (2010)
(acknowledging the upward price pressures imposed by emissions caps under cap-and-tradeessentially a nationwide emissions cap that imbues the same effect on energy prices as would an
injunction); see also Michael Shellenberger et al., Fast, Clean, & Cheap: Cutting Global Warming's
Gordian Knot, 2 HARV. L. & POL'Y REv. 93, 100-17 (2008).
155. Jonathan B. Wiener, Think Globally,Act Globally: The Limits of Local Climate Policies,
155 U. PA. L. REV. 1961, 1967-73 (2007) (detailing how geographically circumscribed emissions
caps can induce perverse results with leakage). For reference, in 2008 the commercial and industrial
sectors consumed about 63 percent of the electricity of America (36 and 27 percent, respectively).
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEw 2008, at 259 tbl.8.9,
availableat http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/aer/. In addition to the leakage phenomenon, with respect
to households in particular, those who remain in capped monopolized zones could choose to supplement their energy consumption with power from other GHG-producing sources-such as
propane, wood, and other combustibles-for heating and cooking needs.
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Unless the defendants' consumers were somehow precluded from
acquiring energy from non-party competitors or other power sourceswhether those consumers relocate or remain in place-climate nuisance
plaintiffs cannot show beyond a speculative level that capping several defendants' emissions would translate into any slowing or reduction of climate
change, given the possibility of energy source substitution or
supplementation.1 6 This proves fatal to plaintiffs' standing, regardless of
line-drawing problems with potential relief levels and defendant joining.
CONCLUSION

The future of the American Electric Power controversy and climate
change tort litigation is unclear. In American Electric Power, the district
court must now proceed to the merits of the claim, where at least two equitable arguments-besides causation apportionment difficulties-militate
against the plaintiffs. First, the "clean hands" doctrine' undermines the
claims, since the plaintiffs directly consume the defendants' product (energy) and thus comprise an essential component of the very emissions
stream that causes climate change.' The defendants ultimately fuel their
own injury; therefore they lack clean hands to complain about the process.'59 Moreover, the "balancing of equities" doctrine'6 could be
problematic for the plaintiffs, given the de minimis benefit that they would

156. The plaintiffs, invoking federal jurisdiction, bear the burden of establishing the elements
of Article III standing. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61.
157. Under this doctrine, plaintiffs who are at least partly responsible for the harm in question
are barred from seeking an injunction against it. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 941 cmt.
b ("Insofar as one of the parties is responsible for the particular hardship factor in the situation, this
is an element weighing against that party."). This principle, grounded in fairness concerns as well as
incentives considerations, is theoretically comparable to the contributory negligence and "comingto-the-nuisance" doctrines.
158. After all, while the defendants can invest in cleaner forms of energy generation, the
plaintiffs can just as well demand less of the defendants' product and achieve the same relief by,
for example, decreasing power-consuming activities or making public facilities more energy
efficient-probably at a lower net cost. See Kate Gilbraith, McKinsey Report Cites $1.2 Trillion
in Potential Savings From Energy Efficiency, N.Y. TIMES (July 29, 2009, 11:26 AM),
http://greeninc.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/07/29/mckinsey-report-cites-12-trillion-in-potentialsavings-from-energy-efficiency/ (reporting a study showing that the United States could save
$1.2 trillion through 2020 by investing $520 billion in energy efficiency); FLANNERY, supra note
3 at 302-06 (hailing energy efficiency and conservation measures as an immediate means of
reducing GHG emissions). Emissions are generated by and on behalf of many groups-from
"upstream" extractors of fossil fuels, to middlemen convertors of them (utilities and refineries),
to "downstream" businesses, households, and individuals who ultimately consume the energyso it is illogical and unjust to assign fault to any one segment for the collective resultant harm.
159. This Note does not consider whether middleman defendants like those in American
Electric Power might, if climate nuisance actions proceed, implead actors from other segments or
seek indemnification from them, given the interrelation of emissions liability. This possibility seems
worthy of attention if climate litigation proceeds.
160. Under this doctrine, courts consider the "relative hardship" between the plaintiff and the
defendant in deciding whether to grant injunctive relief. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 941
cmt. c ("The law expresses a compromise between the conflicting interests of neighbors, in which
many harms must be borne as incidents of communal life.").
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receive compared to the significant burden that an injunction-which
would require either a transformation of energy-generating infrastructure or
a costly acquisition of supplemental energy from cleaner sources in order to
maintain energy supplies-would place on the defendants. 6 2 These arguments are not exhaustive, of course; other defenses on the merits may also
foil the plaintiffs' public nuisance claim.6
From a policy standpoint, it is worth recognizing that this litigation may
be meant more to prompt the federal government to regulate GHG emissions than to gain relief from the enjoinment of the specific defendants.
Sometimes, the judiciary prudently pushes the other branches when they
seem deadlocked and when society appears ripe to embrace progressive
change, as they did in Brown v. Board of Education.'6 However, American

Electric Power does not present a Brown-like situation where such judicial
pushing is appropriate. Whereas cognizing and suggesting a nondiscriminatory standard for equal protection violations of racial segregation required
constitutional expertise-quintessentially within the judiciary's purviewadjudicating climate claims calls for complex scientific and economic
judgments. Additionally, besides wasting judicial resources and legitimacy,
there is valid concern that climate torts could frustrate the fomentation of
more holistic, legislative reform if lawmakers were to become complacent
because they think the courts are dealing with it.
One more concern is that, if successful, the state plaintiffs in American
Electric Power will effectively avoid political accountability by using the
less efficient, less fair means of litigation, as opposed to the more direct
means of legislation, to push low-emissions energy. In either case-judicial
enforcement of emissions reduction or legislative incentivization of it
through tax or cap-and-trade programs, increased funding for public transportation, etc.--emissions theoretically diminish, increasing energy prices
in the short run. The lawsuit avenue, however, implicitly pins the blame for
the resultant cost increases on the utilities, not the elected officials. With
litigation, legislators would not have to face their constituencies and declare
that they have decided to combat climate change by imposing laws that
make GHG emissions-and therefore energy production as a whole-more
expensive. Lawsuit-spurred constraints on emissions still make energy more
costly, just like legislation, with states ultimately propelling the dynamic by
virtue of bringing the claims. However, litigation makes defendant-emitters
the culprits of the price hikes. After all, the impartial judiciary would have
161.

See supra Section

U.B.

162. Cf Boomer v. At. Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 873 (1970) (granting an injunction
conditioned on payment of damages rather than a permanent injunction, where a cement plant
caused a nuisance valued at $185,000 to nearby residents and shutting down the plant would have
resulted in a loss of $45 million and 30 jobs); Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co., 382 P.2d
109 (Okla. 1962) (refusing, in a contract action, to grant an injunction where specific performance
of a clean-up contract would have cost $29,000 but yielded a mere $300 benefit).
163. E.g., Biber, supra note 93, at 1306-08 (noting three challenges to proving causation that
relate to the delayed nature of climate harms).
164.

347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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pointed its authoritative finger at the defendants and pronounced them liable. Further, as the proverbial "bad guys," corporate emitters are easily
assigned fault. Clean energy is a crucial, urgent, difficult prerogative, and
power producers must play a key role in promoting it. But governmental
shirking of transparent ownership of the process through less efficient, less
fair means of redress is irresponsible. Rather, states should stick to legislation and regulatory incentives to achieve the same ends.
At some point, regulation of GHGs under the CAA or some new federal
law could preempt climate nuisance claims, perhaps within a year or two.
Until such time, however, parties to pending climate suits, potential litigants,
and energy consumers are sure to keep an eye on American Electric Power,16 1 given the precedential importance of the case, the tremendous amount
of corporate liability at stake, and the possible bearing on energy prices.
The political question doctrine should extend to bar adjudication of climate-related public nuisance claims seeking injunctive emissions caps,
given the lack of judicially manageable standards and the unavoidability of
making initial policy determinations reserved for the political branches in
this novel stretch of nuisance theory. Moreover, such suits should not pass
Article III standing scrutiny, for redressability is lacking in light of the speculative, at-best nominal relief from climate harms that emissions caps
would offer. Assuming adjudication on the merits of the case, equitable relief principles and political policy considerations further militate against
granting relief. Climate change awareness and energy reform deserve serious, imminent, comprehensive action from the international community,
Congress, the executive branch, and state and local governments. These vital
ends, however, cannot be pursued through private tort litigation in a manner
that is constitutionally prudential, efficient, fair, or effective.

165. The Second Circuit declined to rehear en banc the appeal of the district court's decision
in American Electric Power, though the defendants have moved to stay the appellate court's remand
pending an application for certiorari to the Supreme Court. Brian Hansen, Utilities petition Supreme
Court to overturn court ruling on C02 as a public nuisance, GLOBAL POWER REPORT, Mar. 18,
2010, available at 2010 WLNR 6750666. Meanwhile, the Fifth Circuit will rehear en banc the appeal of Comer, Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 598 E3d 208 (5th Cir. 2010), and the plaintiffs in
Kivalina have appealed the dismissal of their case to the Ninth Circuit, Native Vill. of Kivalina v.
ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. Cal. 2009), appealfiled,No. 09-17490 (9th Cir. Nov.
5, 2009).
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